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REAL ESTATE STEERING AND THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968
INTRODUCTION
Racial discrimination in housing has perpetuated a segregated
housing market. Exclusionary zoning,' restrictive covenants, 2 red-
lining' and burdensome application or financing requirements 4 have
been some of the primary methods used to further discrimination in
housing. A comparatively recent discriminatory practice which main-
tains segregated housing is steering.5 Steering is accomplished by a
1. Exclusionary zoning basically consists of various methods designed to exclude
minority and lower-income individuals from living in certain residential areas. The "ex-
clusion" is usually accomplished through the use of either minimum lot size requirements
which tend to raise the cost of housing beyond the level of many lower-income and
minority group members, or by merely excluding certain types of housing, such as apart-
ment buildings, which would provide housing for such individuals. HAGMAN, URBAN
PLANNING, 498 (1971). See Palto Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908(N.D. Cal.), affd, 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
2. Restrictive covenants are clauses contained in deeds which are intended to con-
trol either the actual use of the deeded property or the types of individuals who may
purchase or occupy the property. Restrictive covenants have gained the most notoriety
when used for purposes of racial segregation. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
3. "Redlining" refers to the discriminatory practice of lending institutions in deny-
ing home loans for individuals and residences located within specific geographical areas
of a city which the lender has concluded are high risk areas. The term "redlining" it-
self is a method of describing how the lender physically demarcates the undesirable lend-
ing areas on a map. The offensive aspect of this practice relates to the fact that fre-
quently the redlined areas involve portions of the city inhabited by minority group mem-
bers. This has provided the basis for the charge that redlining is a racially discrimina-
tory practice. See Note, Urban Housing Finance and the Redlining Controversy, 25
CLEV. ST. L. Rnv. 110) (1976). See also Duncan, Hood and Neet, Redlining Practices,
Resegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alterna-
tive, 7 URBAN IAw. 510 (1975); Doehrman, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and
Sherman Act Violations Raised by Lending Policies, 8 INDIANA L. REv. 1045 (1975).
4. These practices could vary considerably from charging a higher interest rate or
downpayment on the purchase of property to restrictive terms in the mortgage or lease
agreement. However, such practices are specifically prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 3605(Supp. IV 1974), which concerns discrimination in financing.
5. While it is not clear when the term "steering" itself was coined (probably subse-
quent to the Civil Rights Act of 1968), the practice of keeping certain prospective pur-
chasers from buying property in certain neighborhoods was established and accepted
prior to 1950. See note 53 infra and accompanying text. It is difficult to determine
whether steering was always motivated by race, especially prior to the Fair Housing Act.
However, most if not all, steering claims allege a racial motivation.
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real estate agent or broker when a potential customer is either encour-
aged or discouraged from purchasing housing in a particular area or
community because of the agent's actions. This comment will examine
the impact of the Fair Housing Act on steering violations. More spe-
cifically, it will endeavor to define the practice of steering, determine
the requisite activities which constitute a violation and evaluate the
damages and remedies available.6
BACKGROUND
Realization of the impact of steering and other similar practices
has led to the enactment of legislation prohibiting acts which impede
the movement toward equality in housing. In 1968 Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act and included therein Title VIII, the Fair Housing
Act,7 which was designed to eliminate all discrimination in the sale and
lease of housing.8 A contemporaneous action by the United States
Supreme Court construed the Civil Rights Act of 1866' as applying
equally to private as well as to state acts of racial discrimination. In
deciding Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.,'0 the Court found that the same
right to purchase as is enjoyed by white citizens could be impaired as
effectively by those who own or place the property on the market as
by the state."'
It has been recognized that discrimination does not occur solely
from refusals to sell property but also through the development of more
6. Particular consideration will be given to the use of testers and in relation
thereto, the issue of standing.
7. The Fair Housing Act is codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970 & Supp. IV
1974). The purpose of this act was to eliminate all discrimination in the acquisition
of housing. See generally Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and Perspec-
tive, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969); 1968 U.S. CODE OF CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMiNIS-
TRATIvE NEws 1837.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970) states that "lilt is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."
(emphasis added).
9. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), states:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
Traditionally, § 1982 was only applicable to state acts of discrimination.
10. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
11. Id. at 421. However, the Court also held that § 1982 was not to be construed
as a comprehensive housing law as it did not deal with discrimination other than that
which was racially motivated nor with the provision of services in connection with the
sale of a dwelling. Additionally, the Court found that this interpretation of § 1982 did
not diminish the significance of the Fair Housing Act. Id. at 413.
1977]
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subtle means. 12  Therefore, both of the above acts have been inter-
preted broadly' 3 to help eliminate those practices which are not specifi-
cally enumerated in the legislation.
THE CONCEPT OF STEERING
Basically, steering can be described as a process by which realtors
attempt to guide a particular buyer away from or towards housing in
a specified area. 14  Usually, this practice is premised on the notion that
the buyer will be either incompatible or unacceptable to the residents
of a housing area due to his race, religion or national origin, or that
the residents of an area will be unacceptable to that buyer due to racial,
religious or ethnic differences.' 5
12. Bogen and Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD.
L. R. 59, 61 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Racial Statistics). Since a refusal to sell was
often considered blatant evidence of steering, other, more subtle methods, of promoting
segregation, such as words or actions to discourage the purchaser, were developed.
13. The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), gave
a broad construction to the Civil Rights Act of '1860. With reference to the Fair
Housing Act, the language in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Supp. IV 1974) makes it unlawful
[tlo refuse to.sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to re-
fuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.(emphasis added). See United States v. Youritan Construction Co., 370 F. Supp. 643
(N.D. Cal. 1973), modified on other grounds, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975), wherein
the district court pointed out that the Congressional intention was for the language to
cover a broad range of activities. 370 F. Supp. at 648. In Fair Housing Council of
Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 1071 (N.J. 1976), the court stated:
This § 3604(a) prohibition is broadly drafted. It clearly reflects Congres-
sional intent to extirpate the poisonous influence of racial, religious and ethnic
prejudice in the Nation's housing markets.
Id. at 1075. The comprehensiveness of the phrase "or otherwise make unavailable" is
arguably limited when strictly construed. See notes 17-19 infra and accompanying text.
14. It is important to consider a distinction between the motivation of realtors in
steering and that of the individual who places the dwelling on the housing market.
While the activities of the realtor may be equally in contravention of the law, they are
generally made in response to the attitudes and practices of the community. In a major-
ity of cases, the primary determinant is the racial fear of the residents in the areas in-
volved. See, e.g., Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975). This com-
munity standard, which has an impact on the realtor and the success of his business vis-
ii-vis boycotts, is often totally contrary to his personal beliefs and practices. In Zuch
the court initiated the discussion of its findings by recognizing that
[p]erhaps the single most significant factor operating in this case is the
racial fear of the white residents of the areas involved. At times, this fear
has become so irrational and pervasive that it reflects a hysterical community
psyche.
Id. at 1030. The court also found it would have to distinguish between results based
on those fears and those based on an exploitation of those fears. Id. at n.2.
15. Thus, the realtor is directing the prospective purchaser to an area where the
realtor believes the party will be most comfortable. Although religion, national origin,
and sex discrimination are also protected under Title VIII, most, if not all, litigation
3
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Initially, steering was interpreted to mean the guiding of a pro-
spective purchaser through the use of verbal persuasion. 6  Sub-
sequently, the concept of steering has been expanded to include as a
violation any act which influences the choice of the buyer or impedes
the home purchase 7 However, there have been attempts to distinguish
between discouraging the prospective purchaser and a failure or refusal
to show certain available real estate.'" An interpretation of the phrase
"or otherwise make unavailable' in 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) to mean
that it must be made completely unavailable can be logically supported
if this phrase is strictly construed.' 9 It is argued though, that real
estate brokers would be immune from liability if the interpretation was
limited to acts which rendered purchase impossible.20
Regardless of whether the phrase is strictly or liberally inter-
preted, it is difficult to see how the realtor is rendering the property
unavailable where there is an opportunity to inspect the property, as
the buyer will ultimately make his own decision regarding purchase.
It is doubtful that anyone would suggest that the realtor make no com-
ments regarding the property. On the contrary, customers rely on the
has been concerned with racially motivated discrimination. See Note, Racial Steering:
The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE LJ. 808, 809, n.7 (1975) (hereinafter
cited as Racial Steering).
16. Steering took place when the purchaser was directed to a particular neighbor-
hood upon reliance of the realtor's representations. Present day steering tactics include
restriction of the clients who view the property, misrepresentations made to prospective
purchasers, selective advertising, and discriminatory treatment of black sales personnel
and brokers dealing regularly with black clients. 422 F. Supp. at 1075.
17. In reference to steering, the court in Zuch found that 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)
makes it unlawful to steer or channel a prospective buyer into or away from
an area because of race. Unlawful steering or channeling of a prospective
buyer is the use of a word, phrase or action by a real estate broker or salesper-
son which is intended to influence the choice of a prospective property buyer
on a racial basis....
Accordingly, any action by a real estate agent which in any way impedes,
delays, or discourages on a racial basis a prospective home buyer from purchas-
ing housing is unlawful.
394 F. Supp. at 1047.
18. See Quinlan and Tyson, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 25 Il. App. 3d 879, 324 N.E.
2d 65 (1975). In this case a city housing ordinance prohibited outright refusals to show
real estate but did not prohibit discouraging the purchasers. The court stated that steer-
ing was not prohibitied and the language of the ordinance implicitly required a request
to see the property before a refusal could be made. Id. at 75.
19. One commentator suggests this interpretation should be avoided by deciding
steering claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (Supp. IV 1974). See Racial Steering, supra
note 15 at 818. Presumably § 3604(b) provides a broader prohibition of steering by
construing any different treatment of customers as discrimination. See notes 47-49 infra
and accompanying text.
20. See Racial Steering, supra note 15 at 814. This is possible due to the logical
extension of the premise that a refusal to negotiate is only an impediment and not an
absolute foreclosure to obtaining housing.
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representations made to them about the area residents, the schools, and
public services. While there are other sources of information available
to the buyer,21 a deprivation would result if the prospective purchaser
could not tap the expert source of information of the broker where the
answers to the prospective purchaser's questions could be considered
steering.2" In response, distinctions have been created between advice
and information, suggesting that it is the demeanor of the salesperson
which determines steering.23
It is not disputed that the Fair Housing Act protects the freedom
of choice for the purchaser, 24 but to what extent this freedom should
extend is as yet unsettled due to the inherently subjective nature2 , of
the complaints. These characteristics allow complaints to be easily al-
leged but difficult to disprove. Consequently, to determine the scope
of any definition of steering, it is essential to consider the criteria for
finding a violation.
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act
To appreciate the complexity of distinguishing which words and
actions of the realtor will actually constitute a violation, it is necessary
to view the real estate business as a service that disseminates informa-
tion covering a broad spectrum of factors usually considered by pro-
spective purchasers. The problem arises as to which of these factors
may indicate or imply a racial motivation for discrimination. 20
Inasmuch as steering may result in segregated housing, it is neces-
sary to consider the motivation for the steering to determine whether
it will be considered to have contravened the Fair Housing Act. The
21. Other sources of information would include that provided by residents of the
area, the local Chamber of Commerce or some similar agency, or by anyone familiar
with the neighborhood where the contemplated purchase was to take place.
22. See Note, An Anti-blockbusting Ordinance, 7 HA v. J. LEOss. 402, 412 (1970).
23. See Racial Steering, supra note 15 at n.29.
24. The court in Zuch discussed the purpose of the Fair Housing Act in terms of
providing a freedom of choice for the purchaser by eliminating influential factors such
as race. 394 F. Supp. at 1047.
25. The fact that a steering complaint is alleged and even proven does not necessar-
ily establish a violation in a similar circumstance as same people may feel discriminated
against when others would not even consider that possibility. Hence the qualitative and
subjective character of steering complaints. See National Association of Realtors, REAL-
TORS GUIDE TO PRACTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY IN HousiNG 51 (1975) (hereinafter cited
as REALTORS GUIDE).
26. It has been noted that not all housing patterns, especially in segregated areas,
can be explained as economic disparities between races or as the result of individual
choice. Racial Steering, supra note 15 at 808. Therefore, it follows that the real estate
industry must play a role in the creation of these areas.
[Vol. 12:758
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general consensus is that a violation has occurred if the steering or dis-
crimination was racially motivated.27  One case, cited in several
subsequent decisions, held that the Civil Right Act of 1866 prohibited
any discussion of race.2" Theoretically, this means that any reference
to race in a transaction would constitute a violation. Practically, this
standard has come to mean that a court need not find that racial
prejudice is the sole motivating factor in the steering.29  Once the raci-
ally motivated discrimination has been shown to be a factor, the bur-
den of proof of showing that race was not a significant facor in the
steering shifts to the alleged discriminator. s0
There are many factors,3 1 personal to the prospective purchaser,
which may have given the realtor good reason to emphasize a particular
area. Perhaps the most troublesome of these would be community re-
lated factors such as the quality and location of the schools, transporta-
27. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Company, Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974);
Haythe v. Decker Realty Co., 468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp.
151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
28. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970). In this case,
the seventh circuit cited the decision in Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (wherein
the Supreme Court found the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 to be plain and unambigu-
ous) as support for finding discrimination in a refusal to rent an apartment to a young
black woman who was divorced, working, and caring for her infant child. The court
stated that "same right" in § 1982 "means that race is an impermissible factor in an
apartment rental decision and that it cannot be brushed aside because it was neither the
sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor of discrimination." 436 F.2d at 349-
50.
29. In Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969), the court's decision con-
tained the following espousal of the prohibitions of § 1982:
Section 1982 does not prohibit an owner from considering factors other
than race in determining whether to sell or rent this property to a negro, or
to any other person for that matter. An owner can refuse to rent or sell to
anyone, negro or white, for any reason he chooses so long as the motivating
reason for this decision is not the individual's race or color.
Id. at 162. These factors included not only the credit standing, financial stability, repu-
tation, age, size of the family, age of the children, and anticipated length of stay of the
applicant, but also subjective factors such as the applicant's appearance, demeanor, and
the owner's estimation of his trustworthiness. However, the court also noted that the
owner may be called upon in court to demonstrate his reliance upon these factors as
opposed to racial considerations. Id.
30. The plaintiff must show that (1) the owner had placed the property on the
market, (2) the plaintiff was willing to meet the owner's terms, (3) the plaintiff had
communicated this willingness to the owner, (4) the owner had refused plaintiff on
those terms, and (5) there was no reason for the refusal other than the plaintiff's race.
Upon establishing these elements, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut this evi-
dence by showing reasons other than race for the refusal. Id. at 163. But see United
States v. Henshaw Brothers, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974), where the court
stated that other criteria may not be used as a subterfuge for racial discrimination. The
criteria allegedly forming the basis for the refusal in this case was the applicant's non-
officer status. The court did not accept this as a valid reason.
31. These factors include price range, financial stability, age, and size of the family.
Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
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tion, property values, proximity to employment and the crime rate.
The use of these factors in the practice of steering creates difficulties
because they are used to an equal extent in many legitimate trans-
actions.
It is imperative then to determine the motivation of the realtor
in making statements regarding community related factors. Thus the
designation of "code words" 2 to indicate a discriminatory act is helpful
in establishing steering. However, two limitations should be made in
respect to the use of these code words and consequently on the scope
of a steering violation. First, such a designation could give rise to
claims of infringement of the realtor's first amendment rights. By con-
struing certain words as prima facie evidence of a violation, the realtor
is deprived of his right to free speech. Secondly, it has been proposed
that when code words are used by the prospective purchaser to solicit
a discussion of racial factors, a response by the realtor to such inquiries
should not be considered illegal. In this instance, the realtor does not
initiate the discussion; therefore, it is difficult to establish his intent to
steer.8
The enforcement of the fair housing policy is limited to those acts
"within constitutional limitations." 4 Therefore, it is not superfluous to
consider claims of infringement of thos6 protected rights. First amend-
ment claims are more prevalent in regards to blockbusting violations03
but are also relevant to situations involving steering. In United States
v. Saroff,36 a district court held that a realtor's good faith response
to an inquiry regarding a racial factor was not a per se violation.37
Reliance has been placed on this interpretation by an association
32. Such code words would describe the community as "uncomfortable", "changing",
"busted", "deteriorating", and with an "undesirable element". When steering has been
alleged to exist in situations where the purchaser has been directed toward a segregated
area, such words as "good" and "nice" have been considered code words. See, e.g., Zuch
v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1039 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
33. Id. at 1039, n.10.
34. See note 8 supra.
35. "Blockbusting" is defined as making representations, regarding the entry of a
person of a particular race into a neighborhood, to induce an owner of property to sell
or rent his property. See note 56 infra. For a discussion of blockbusting, see generally
Note, An Anti-blockbusting Ordinance, 7 HAnv. J. LEGIs. 402 (1972).
36. 377 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
37. Id. The court could not find sufficient evidence to establish the intent to steer
from statements made by the realtor's agents without his knowledge. An omission of
the availability of a dwelling without additional support cannot sustain finding a viola-
tion where such omission could be caused by distraction or absentmindedness. Tomlin-
son Agency v. Pennsylvania, (Commw. Ct. 1973), 1 Hous. & D-v. REP. .(BNA), Cur-
rent Developments, (No. 18) D-7 (January 1, 1974).
[Vol. 12:758
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of realtors which has suggested to its members that a request for racial
information may be answered, absent any unusual circumstances,
when it is accompanied by a disclaimer of any intention to show or
offer homes on a racial basis. 8s Another court has found that an ordi-
nance prohibiting real estate agents making statements concerning the
physical deterioration of certain housing areas was an unconstitutionally
vague and overly broad restriction of free speech.3 9
Although it could be argued that the Fair Housing Act is unneces-
sarily broad both in its language and as applied, such a contention
would likely be viewed with judicial and administrative disfavor, since
such power is necessary to eliminate something as pervasive as discrimi-
nation in housing. The freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment
are extensive but are not without limitation. Obviously, one such limi-
tation would be racially motivated comments designed to perpetuate
discrimination in housing.40 Additionally, it has been demonstrated
that Title VII regulates conduct, including speech, which can justifiably
be inhibited because of the interest in protecting communities from
such conduct.41  To summarize the interaction between the first
amendment and Title VII, it should be sufficient to state that enforce-
ment will not infringe those guaranteed rights because it is only em-
ployed against those statements not protected under the first amend-
ment. Likewise, those statements made without a discriminatory moti-
vation42 are protected.
38. See R.ALTORS GuEDE, supa note 25 at 43. However, as advised in REALTORS
GuirE, no such response could be made to a request for a locational preference based
on race. Id.
39. De Kalb Real Estate Board, Inc. v. Chairman and Bd. of Comm'rs 372 F. Supp.
748 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The court in DeKalb further established that:
Because of the vagueness of this provision, it is conceivable that most brokers
would avoid all representations concerning the physical condition of property
rather than risk revocation of their broker's license. Such a result is clearly
unacceptable, especially when measured by the importance of vagueness and
and overbreadth in a sensitive area such as free speech. Such an interference
with speech must be carefully and narrowly drawn.
Id. at 755.
40. Another limitation is commercial speech, see, e.g., United States v. Bob
Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973). Opinion of Evelle Younger (Cal.
Atty. Gen. Opin. SO 74/15, February 11, 1975), 2 Hous. & Dnv. REP. (BNA), Current
Developments, 1063. See also Limitations regarding discriminatory advertising under 42
U.S.C. § 3604(c) (Supp. IV 1974), e.g., United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
41. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
42. See, e.g., Abel v. Lomenzo, 18 N.Y.2d 619, 219 N.E.2d 287 (1966), where the
court stated "that so long as information given by a broker to prospective purchaser is
accurate and neither in content nor purpose seeks to encourage racial bias as regards
housing, it is unexceptionable." Id. 219 N.E.2d at 287. See also, Note, Housing and
Section 1982: The Advisability of Extending the Statutory Mandate Beyond Acts of
Traditional Discrimination, 1975 Dunn L.J. 781, 800.
1977]
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As discussed above,45 the phrase in § 3604(a) "or otherwise
make unavailable," when strictly construed, may be an impediment to
proving a violation. As a result, the other subsections of § 360444 have
been set forth as alternatives for eliminating discrimination through
steering. When certain words in § 3604(c) are emphasized, that sub-
section can be interpreted as extending beyond its stated and intended
purpose of prohibiting discriminatory advertising.45 If steering is ac-
complished by a representation that the property is not available, when
in fact it is currently on the market, the violation is specifically covered
by § 3604(d).4  The primary focus on an alternative section though,
has been on § 3604(b) ,'7 referred to as the "colorblind" standard. 48
It is not difficult to see how § 3604(b) could be construed as pro-
scribing discrimination in the services related to the sale or lease of
a dwelling. Such an interpretation would broaden the scope of activi-
ties to be regulated and a violation could exist where a realtor treated
similarly situated people differently. 49 The determination to be made
is whether the phrase "in connection therewith" is meant to apply to
the transaction or the dwelling. An effective elimination of steering
can be accomplished when the phrase is found to modify the trans-
action or sale of a dwelling. On the other hand, it is equally possible
to find that this subsection prohibits discrimination of services in con-
nection with the dwelling rather than the transaction, especially where
the dwelling is an apartment or a condominium. Acceptance of the
43. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
44. These sections are listed in notes 45-47 infra, with the exception of § 3604(e)
which is discussed in note 56 infra and accompanying text.
45. See Racial Steering, supra note 15 at 816, n.31. 42 U.S.C. 3604(c) (Supp. IV
1974) provides that it shall be unlawful
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published
any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of
a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such pref-
erence, limitation, or discrimination.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (Supp. IV 1974) prohibits anyone
[t]o represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (Supp. IV 1974) makes it unlawful
[t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
48. See Racial Steering, supra note 51 at 818. This standard has been so designated
in order to reflect the prohibition of all discriminatory practices in providing brokerage
services.
49. However, no court has yet construed the phrase "in the provision of services
or facilities in connection therewith", nor can it be determined from the legislative in-
tent. Id.
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former interpretation would presumably eliminate any first amendment
problem50 but would also necessitate the use of testers to prove dis-
crimination. 51
Steering in Response to Anti-blockbusting Statutes
Prior to 1950, the Code of Ethics of the National Association of
Realtors 2 required that members promise not to introduce anyone of
incompatible character into a neighborhood if that action would lower
the property values of the area.5 3  While steering actions in response
to that clause may have been premised upon community standards and
practices, they clearly manifested segregated housing. Even though
this section has been rendered invalid by the Association's present Code
of Equal Opportunity" which reiterates the policy of the Fair Housing
Act, the concept that integration of a neighborhood would result in un-
pleasant consequences to the neighborhood residents and the realtor
has remained. 55 Therefore, it is possible to conclude that steering can
be motivated solely on the basis of race or in response to some other
policy.
It is proposed that steering may in fact be a response to anti-
blockbusting legislation similar to § 3604(e).30 Support for this con-
tention may be found by comparing the results of a Title VIII violation
and a continuation of the policy of the prior Code of Ethics. By at-
tempting to avoid a blockbusting violation, a realtor may engage in the
same practices that occur while steering a prospective purchaser away
50. Id. at 818, n.47. The steering claim would not be premised on the statements
made to one prospective purchaser but rather on the different treatment of various
prospective purchasers.
51. Discussed infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. See Racial Steering, supra
note 15 at 821, n.48. The testers would be utilized to determine whether different treat-
ment was accorded buyers with similar needs.
52. Known as the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) until
1973.
53. Article 34 of NAREB's Code of Ethics stated:
A realtor should never be instrumntal in introducing into a neighborhood
a character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or
any individual whose presence would clearly be detrimental to property values
in that neighborhood.
See Note, Ravial Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33
MD. L.R. 289, 320 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Five Years After].
54. See Five Years After, supra note 53 at 320.
55. See REALTORs GUIDE, supra note 25 at 15.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. IV 1974) makes it unlawful
[flor profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any
dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the
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from a housing area. This is not to say, however, that such practices
should be condoned, nor is it offered to absolve the realtor from liabil-
ity. The only purpose is to point out a possible non-racial motivation
for steering. A motivation of this type may be related to the conten-
tion that when steering is used to promote integration it can also act
as a pretext for blockbusting.57
Remedies and Damages
Once the discriminatory violation has been established a decision
must be made concerning enforcement of the law and the type of
remedial relief desired. In addition, it may be necessary to distinguish
which parties have standing to enforce those remedies.
Generally, the Fair Housing Act provides three methods of en-
forcement: (1) an administrative proceeding;58 (2) a civil action;"0 and
(3) an action by the United States Attorney General.60 The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 also provides for enforcement through a civil action
brought by the injured plaintiff himself but contains no express provi-
sions regarding damages. 61
To follow the administrative course, the aggrieved party must file
a written complaint within one hundred and eighty days after the in-
cident with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). 2 Subsequently, the Secretary will furnish a copy of the com-
plaint to the alleged discriminator, investigate the complaint within
thirty days and, upon notice to the parties, may attempt to resolve the
complaint through informal means. If he fails to resolve the matter,
the complainant may file a civil action."3 However, any information
or admissions obtained during attempted settlement stages may not be
used in subsequent proceedings without the written consent of the par-
ties. Thus, the apparent advantage of using this route, the availability
57. See Racial Steering, supra note 15 at 812 and n.57.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3611 (1970).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). However, an action brought under this section would
be limited to racial steering. See Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
62. See note 58 supra.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970) provides, in pertinent part, that
Such civil actions may be brought without regard to the amount in controversy
in any United States district court for the district in which the discriminatory
housing practice is alleged to have occurred or be about to occur or in which
the respondent resides or transacts business.
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of administrative investigative resources,64 is limited to the informal
HUD procedures. The accessibility of this remedy may also be con-
ditioned on the existence of a substantially equivalent remedy under a
state or local agency."s
The judicial remedy prescribed for civil actions" provides injunc-
tive relief to preserve the rights guaranteed by this title. Such relief is
often necessary where the primary interest is in the housing itself, not
monetary damages flowing from the discrimination.61 In addition, the
court may award actual and punitive damages, court costs and rea-
sonable attorney fees.6"
It is important to note that actual damages under -this section, as
well as under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, have been extended to in-
clude compensatory damages for humiliation, inferred from the circum-
stances surrounding the violation. 69 A significant feature of the imple-
mentation of both this remedy and that initiated by the Attorney Gen-
eral is that the proceeding will be assigned for hearing at the earliest
possible date,70 thereby avoiding any incidental damages accruing from
the delay.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 3611 (1970). See 1 HANDBOOK ON HousING Lw (P-H), Guide
to Federal Housing Redevelopment and Planning Programs, Ch. 9, p. 8 (1970) (herein-
after cited as HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAW). Any information obtained through these
resources may not be used in a subsequent proceeding unless consented to by both par-
ties. Id. Therefore, the investigation is only helpful in establishing a claim under
HUD.
65. 42 U.S.C. 3610(c) (1970). If a state or local housing ordinance provides rights
similar to this section, the Secretary of HUD shall notify the appropriate agency and
defer action for a period of thirty days. This restriction is also applicable to the sub-
sequent filing of a civil action where there is an appropriate judicial remedy under a
state or local fair housing law. Id.
66. See note 59 supra.
67. See HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAW, supra note 64. It is possible that the housing
market is so restricted that the dwelling involved is the only appropriate one available.
68. 42 U.S.C. 3612(c) (1970). The award of attorney fees will only be allowed
where, in the opinion of the court, the plaintiff is not financially able to assume such
fees. Financial ability has been interpreted to mean the plaintiff's finances will enable
him to assume the expenses not just his present ability to pay. It is also pointed out
that this allowance to a successful civil rights plaintiff is not regarded as a punitive dam-
age but that its purpose is to encourage those injured parties to seek judicial relief. See
Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 385 (10th Cir. 1973).
69. Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty
Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973). The prospective purchaser may have been
•lenied the dwelling in front of his family of friends and thereby may feel belittled and
humiliated.
70. 42 U.S.C. 3614 (1970) provides for expedition of proceedings by requiring
"[a]ny court in which a proceeding is instituted under section 3612 or 3613 of this title
shall assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date and cause the case to
be in every way expedited."
12
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The third method provides that the Attorney General may com-
mence an action whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that an
individual or group is engaging in a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
tion or that any group has been denied rights guaranteed under Title
VIII. 71 This method of enforcement may be preferred in some cases
as it allows preventive relief. Also, under this procedure the investiga-
tive resources of HUD may be utilized by the Attorney General. The
difficulty with this mode of obtaining relief is the standard of proof
required in establishing the existence of a "pattern or practice."
Some courts have been flexible in this requirement, 2 while others have
demanded that a greater burden be met.73 Unlike the other means
of enforcement, an action brought by the Attorney General need not
address the issue of standing, which has become an increasingly more
important focal point in fair housing litigation.
Standing
The process by which standing is determined depends primarily
upon the specifications of the legislation, which usually are related to
the damages suffered by the aggrieved party. There is no doubt that
those parties at whom the discrimination is directed are significantly
deprived of equal housing and therefore are provided standing to vindi-
cate their rights. However, the harm that collateral parties suffer is
generally more remote and thus they have less of an immediate need
to file a claim of discrimination. Standing is, therefore, more restricted
as to these individuals. One such collateral party, common to many
fair housing proceedings, is the "tester."
A tester is instrumental in providing proof of a violation by posing
as a purchaser with similar, if not the same, criteria for housing and
approximately the same personal characteristics as the aggrieved
party74 except for the fact that the tester is of a different race. Any sig-
nificantly different treatment of the tester by a realtor provides a good
71. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). A finding that a group has been denied rights
granted under Title VIII is not alone sufficient to constitute a violation. Such denial
must first raise an issue of general public importance. Id.
72. See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty Co., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973)
where an individual act was held to constitute a pattern or practice of discrimination.
73. United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Fla. 1972). To prove a
pattern or practice of discrimination in housing, the government was required to show
that the act was not an isolated, accidental or peculiar departure from a nondiscrimina-
tory norm. Id. at 1133.
74. See REALTORS GumE, supra note 25 at 51. The tester maintains the same price
range, family size and neighborhood selection as the prospective purchaser.
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basis for a claim of racial discrimination; consequently the tester is very
valuable to the plaintiffs in any resulting litigation. Furthermore, it
has been shown that the use of testers may be the only effective method
of obtaining proof of housing discrimination. r5  This belief is so per-
vasive that a state statute prohibiting the use of testers was held invalid
as an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of the Fair Housing Act
and chilling the exercise of the right to equal housing.76 On the other
hand, since, to prove a violation it is often necessary for the tester to
induce the broker into believing an actual sale would occur, one com-
mentator has suggested that the use of testers smacks of entrapment.
77
If the practice of using testers is condoned categorically, the door may
be left open for harassment of realtors through various agencies em-
ploying testers.
Irrespective of any debate concerning the efficacy of using testers,
it is more important to determine whether testers or other collateral
parties have an independent cause of action for housing discrimination.
Similarly, consideration should be given to whether fair housing organ-
izations or the residents of an affected community have standing. In
Zuch v. Hussey,7 8 the court considered the argument that housing may
not be made unavailable, so as to violate § 3604, where the party had
no actual interest in the housing. 9 More specifically in Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,80 the Supreme Court unanimously
held that anyone in the same housing unit who is injured by discrimina-
tory housing practices had standing to sue under § 3610 of the Fair
Housing Act. Standing was broadened by this interpretation, but only
as to those complaints filed with the Secretary of HUD under § 3610.
Thus when an action was commenced under § 3612 'by homeowners
alleging an injury of deprivation of the benefits derived from living in
an integrated community, the standing granted in Traflicante was held
inapplicable."'
75. 394 F. Supp. at 1051, see Racial Statistics supra note 12 at 64.
76. United States v. Wisconsin, 395 F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
77. See Racial Statistics, supra note 12 at 65.
78. 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
79. Id. at 1051. The court, however, dismissed the contention that buyer initiated
discussions should absolve the real estate salesperson of liability and consequently over-
ruled the holding of United States v. Saroff, 377 F. Supp. 352, 361 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
394 F. Supp. at 1051, n.l1. But cf.: Racial Steering, supra note 15 at n.48, where the
author proposes that testers may establish a cause of action under § 3604(b) if they
are treated differently by a broker on the basis of race.
80. 409 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court noted: "The definition of person(s) ag-
grieved contained in § 810(a) [3610] is in terms broad, as it is defined as any person
who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice." Id. at 208.
81. TOPIC v. Circle Realty, 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
19771
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In TOPIC v. Circle Realty Co.,82 the Ninth Circuit distinguished
the Trafficante decision on both the facts and the remedies avail-
able under Title VIII. In TOPIC the plaintiffs were residents of a
section of Los Angeles rather than a single apartment complex as in
Trafficante. The court found that the benefits which the plaintiffs
claimed to have been deprived of were so attenuated that no injury
in fact could be established. 83 However, the court found that this
factual distinction was not the controlling factor but rather that §
3612 limited actions to those parties who were the direct objects of
the discriminatory practices.8 4 In so finding, the court indicated that
§ 3610 permits collateral parties to vindicate their rights but that §
3612 provides suit only to enforce the rights specified in § 3604.
Therefore, initial access to the courts was limited to those rights which
could not apply to collateral parties. Since the plaintiffs were home-
owners already, they were not the direct victims of steering violations.
This position is supported by the numerous requirements for suit
enumerated in § 3610 as contrasted with the notable lack of require-
ments under § 3612. Additionally, § 3614, which concerns the expe-
dition of proceedings, applies only to § 3612 and not to § 3610. sr The
underlying policy was made clear in that not only was this distinction
a protection against excess litigation, but it also provided an adequate
administrative remedy for those parties who would not suffer greater
damages by a delay. The judicial remedy was therefore reserved for
those who would suffer more severely if they were unable to obtain im-
mediate judicial relief. This order of priority would require third
parties to seek relief under § 3610 to allow easy access to § 3612 for
direct victims of discrimination.
160 (1976). The alleged deprivation consisted of the social and economic benefits of
living in an integregated community and the embarrassment they had suffered from
being stigmatized as residents of a ghetto. 532 F.2d at 1274.
82. 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 1275. Since Los Angeles is a city with many integrated areas, the alleged
deprivation seemed slight.
84. Id. at 1273. But see: Fair Housing Council of Bergen County v. Eastern
Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (N.J. 1976), which de-
clined to follow the result suggested by TOPIC. The court in Bergen County failed to
decide the case in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision by finding that no distinction
should be drawn between the apartment complex in Trafficante and the community in
Topic. The court found to the contrary regarding the attenuation of damages, in that
the effects of steering practices may be more severe by affecting more people. It was
also held that it was impossible to distinguish any standing difference as to § 3610 and
§ 3612 from the language in the Trafficante decision. Thus, the court allowed the Fair
Housing Council to establish standing as the representative of those of its members who
were injured by the practices.
85. 532 F.2d at 1275. The court in TOPIC felt that its position on standing was
consistent with the statutory intent of Title VIII,
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CONCLUSION
The elimination of racially discriminatory practices such as steer-
ing is necessary to achieve the purposes stated in the Fair Housing Act.
In accomplishing this purpose, the courts must follow the enforcement
procedures closely to avoid an incongruous result. Those parties who
allege they have been the victims of discrimination are provided with
the statutory means to secure their rights which steering may impede.
This should not be considered a mandate to induce a statement or act,
or employ a ruse to establish a violation of Title VIII. The real estate
industry should not become a scapegoat for the "unexpressed fears of
white in integrating areas""" nor should they be allowed to disregard
the legislative intent behind fair housing legislation. The paramount
consideration must be to bring the actions of those directly affected by
any discrimination to a judicial remedy as soon as possible to avoid
further harm. Concurrently, spurious or attenuated claims, especially
those of organizations or testers who do not risk immediate future
injury, should be dealt with and sifted out through HUD's administra-
tive remedies.
Neil C. Bruce
86. See Five Years After, supra note 53 at 322.
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